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In recent years, many studies have been published on 
the question of the Latin American external debt; 
almost all of them have focused on economic, financial 
or political aspects of the issue. The distinguishing 
feature of this article is that it looks at the much less 
discussed legal questions involved. 
In the first few chapters, the author discusses cer-
tain historical developments, including the loans re-
ceived during the period immediately following in-
dependence and some particularly important con-
siderations, such as the principle of "diplomatic pro-
tection", the Drago Doctrine and the questions raised 
in connection with reparations for World War I. He 
then discusses the question of the international Finan-
cial responsibility of the State, and goes on to study in 
depth the legal aspects of the current debt, generated 
in the Eurodollar market. 
In conclusion, the author states that the Latin 
American countries should stress the political nature 
of the debt and the need for increasing public credit to 
the region by increasing the contributions of de-
veloped countries to international financing agencies. 
Emphasis should be placed on the criterion that the 
debt burden should not exceed the capacity and needs 
of the debtor countries. Finally, he proposes specific 
formulas for reducing the debt by transforming it into 
bonds at fixed prices and interest rates. 
"'The author is on the staff of the Inter'American Develop-
ment Bank. This article reflects the personal views of the 
author and not necessarily those of the organization for which 
he works. 
Introduction 
This article refers to the legal aspects of the Latin 
American public debt with commercial banks. It 
does not deal with the question of the private 
debt or that of the Latin American public debt 
with other governments or with governmental 
and intergovernmental agencies. 
Although the legal issues which arise when a 
public body stops servicing its debt have been 
known in Latin America for a long time, there 
are certain elements in the current crisis which 
make it different from other situations that have 
arisen in the past. These include the fact that the 
financing all comes from the same source, i.e., 
the Eurodollar market, and the fact that the debt 
is so high that it has a paralyzing effect on the 
economic and social development of the region 
as a whole. 
In discussing the question, it is useful to go 
into some of the historical background and the 
principles that apply with regard to the financial 
responsibility of the State. We shall also discuss 
the rights a creditor has when loan obligations 
are not met, the characteristics of some of the 
renegotiations that have already been carried out 
and certain legal decisions that have been hand-
ed down in litigation against Latin American 
public entities initiated by banks in United States 
courts. 
The Latin American public debt with com-
mercial banks is formally set down in private 
contracts which are drafted in fairly standard 
terms reflecting the practices and customs usual-
ly followed in respect of Eurodollar financing. 
Each clause in these contracts has been carefully 
drafted by highly experienced financiers and 
lawyers specializing in this field. The main lan-
guage used is English and both the jurisdiction 
and the law applicable —usually those of London 
or New York— to the performance and execu-
tion of these contracts are chosen by the creditor 
banks. Any study of the legal issues arising from 
the performance and execution of these con-
tracts must take into account Anglo-Saxon law. 
As regards the amount owed, the Latin 
American debt is, both in worldwide and in re-
gional terms, the highest financial obligation 
ever recorded. Estimated at US$ 336 billion at 
the end of 1983 (IDB, 1984a, p. 21), it is constantly 
increasing and the burden it represents affects, 
both individually and collectively, the patrimony, 
the income and the living standards of approx-
imately 350 million persons. Should this crisis be 
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aggravated, it could have an unprecedented 
effect on the economy and institutions of the 
region as a whole and of the individual countries 
in it. 
Inasmuch as the burden of the debt also 
seriously impairs the State's ability to carry out its 
basic functions, its impact goes beyond the limits 
of a purely contractual, civil or commercial 
relationship to take on a clearly public signifi-
cance. T h e considerations set forth below with 
respect to the implications of the debt for an 
individual State also apply, to a large extent, to 
the Latin American region as a whole. 
In 1983, the region had to earmark for the 
service of its debt an amount equivalent to 64.6% 
of its current foreign-exchange income from ex-
ports of goods and services for that year; for the 
second year in a row, the net inflow of resources, 
measured as a proportion of gross outlay, show-
ed a negative balance of 35% of disbursements, 
equivalent to an estimated net outflow in 1983, of 
US$ 17 billion (IDB, 1984b, table 59, p. 490) thus 
making Latin America a net exporter of capital. 
In view of the afflictions brought on by the 
crisis, we must take a new look at the validity of 
the financing scheme applied, as reflected in the 
structure of the debt. In 1965, only 12% of the 
La t in Amer i can public ex te rna l debt was 
accounted for by loans from private banks, 
whereas 60% came from bilateral and multi-
lateral official sources (IDB, 1984b, p. 490). In 
1982 this structure had changed radically. Offi-
cial financing had fallen to 30%, whereas com-
mercial banks accounted for 60% of the debt 
(IDB, 1984b). At the same time, the financing 
scheme applied from the 1960s onwards al-
lowed for the gross domestic product to grow 
steadily at annual average rates of no less than 
5% and, during the period 1970-1974, as high as 
7.3% (IDB, 1984a, pp. 25 and 75). From 1982 
onwards, however, as soon as the impact of the 
debt with commercial banks began to be felt, the 
growth rates became consistently negative for the 
region as a whole, to the point that in 1983, the 
average rate was —3.8% (IDB, 1984a). In our 
view, these figures show the need for Latin 
America to insist, at the political level, that offi-
cial financing be increased in order that it may 
resume a rate of growth that is suited to its 
economic and social development needs. 
At present, the bulk of the Latin American 
public debt is accounted for by the private com-
mercial or t ransnat ional banks which have 
moved beyond the borders of their countries of 
origin and operate through the Eurodollar mar-
ket, mainly in London or other cities, and even in 
some mini-States, where they are not subject to 
any regulation whatsoever. The establishment of 
these banking organizations in London coin-
cided with the imposition by the United States of 
various taxes and restrictions on certain banking 
operations in order to reduce the outflow of dol : 
lars from that country during the 1960s. That 
policy, however, had the opposite effect, and a 
significant number of United States banks trans-
ferred their operations to London and other 
places where they were able to make spectacular 
profits without having to worry about the taxes, 
restrictions or regulations that normally apply to 
all banking operations. Although the issue is now 
a rhetorical one, this lack of regulation allowed 
the transnational banks to go overboard in their 
lending operations, increasing their risks to in-
tolerable levels. This had a lot to do with the 
critical situation now being faced by Latin Amer-
ica and by the international banking system in 
general. 
One of the obvious difficulties posed by the 
debt problem arise from the fact that the com-
mercial banks and the governments pursue very 
different objectives. This contradiction in objec-
tives led the Latin American countries to reiter-
ate, in the Cartagena Consensus, the need for 
political consideration to be given to the question 
of the debt at the international level and stress 
that only a meeting of minds of the governments 
of the debtor and creditor countries will bring 
about a change.1 
Latin America has repeatedly stressed the 
need for discussions on the debt to be taken out 
of the private sphere and dealt with at the highest 
intergovernmental level. Unfortunately, the gov-
ernments of creditor countries have not yet 
agreed to this. 
"Consensus of Cartagena de índias, 22 June 1984, Dec-
laration No. 9. 
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I 
Historical background 
1. The early loans 
It is interesting to note some similarities between 
the current crisis and the experience of the Latin 
American republics in the early years of their 
history as independent nations. 
Although the loans that enable the colonies 
to become independent from Spain were 
obtained from private London financiers, they 
clearly had political implications, inasmuch as 
they helped to further the British Government's 
objectives with respect to Spanish America. In 
many cases, beginning with the negotiations be-
gun by Francisco de Miranda in 1791, the En-
glish Government even went so far as to finance 
the patriots who started the revolutionary pro-
cess. Once independence had been declared, the 
new governments, having obtained these loans, 
were accepted as subjects of international credit 
even before they were officially recognized as 
governments. The early legitimacy which British 
trade and finance conferred on the Latin Amer-
ican nations was used to exert pressure on the 
British Government through Parliament, which 
conveyed the demands of those who had vested 
interests in the region and were pressing for offi-
cial recognition (Lynch, 1980). Lord Palmerston 
subsequently stated that it was the financial aid 
received which had enabled the insurgents to 
achieve independence (Webster). 
This initial Latin American experience with 
the London financial world was painful for both 
parties concerned. In the case of the Latin Amer-
ican governments, although the financial aid was 
very significant from the political standpoint, the 
terms under which it was granted were extremely 
harsh. As regards the English lenders, their ex-
pectations were also much greater than what 
could realistically be expected from the Latin 
American economy. The painful outcome of 
these transactions was a general suspension of 
payments which damaged Latin America's credit 
rating for many years and played a decisive role 
in the great crisis of 1825, when 36 banks went 
bankrupt and the Bank of England was forced to 
intervene in the financial markets, a situation 
which gave rise, moreover, to a full parliamen-
tary investigation (Andréadis, 1966, p. 248). 
Another element in these loans was the fact 
that the investing public saw Spanish America as 
a single country; hence, suspension of payments 
on one loan affected the credit of the entire re-
gion. This explains why, in 1826, Mexico decided 
—in a manner similar to its most recent action 
with respect to the Argentine debt— to assist 
Gran Colombia when the latter country was un-
able to meet its commitments as a result of the 
bankruptcy of the Goldschmidt firm. On that 
occasion, Rocafuerte, the Mexican representa-
tive in London, stated that the cause of Spanish 
American solidarity made it essential for the na-
tions of America to help each other preserve 
their good credit rating (Rodriguez, 1975) and 
announced that his country was granting a loan 
to Gran Colombia. This enabled that country to 
overcome its crisis but, unfortunately, it did not 
prevent a subsequent suspension of payments 
(Rodriguez, 1975, p. 168). As Lord Palmerston 
later pointed out, by 1837, Latin America had 
defaulted on the entire amount borrowed from 
1822 onwards (8 023 008 pounds sterling) 
(Webster, Vol. 1, last page). 
2. Diplomatic protection 
During the nineteenth century and the early part 
of the twentieth century, the countries of the 
Northern Hemisphere applied, in their relations 
with other countries and particularly with the 
Latin American countries, the so-called doctrine 
of "diplomatic protection", the purpose of which 
was to assist the person, life or property of their 
nationals abroad. This principle, which dates 
back to ancient history, was taken up by Vattel 
and invoked frequently to justify intervention by 
one country in the affairs of another, under the 
argument that any harm done to a citizen of 
another State was also an offence to the State 
itself, which was thus entitled to demand repara-
tion. 
Latin America's response to the sometimes 
abusive application of diplomatic protection was 
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the so-called Calvo Doctrine (1896), according to 
which a State is not liable for harm suffered by 
aliens as a result of domestic disturbances or civil 
wars. Calvo, basing his conclusions on the prac-
tice of European States towards one another, 
held that the same principle applied to the rela-
tions of those countries with Latin American 
countries. With regard to the diplomatic protec-
tion doctrine invoked by foreign States, Calvo 
affirmed that a State had the sovereign right to 
submit claims by foreigners to its domestic ju-
risdiction and that, in any event, such foreigners 
had the duty to exhaust the national jurisdiction 
before invoking the protection of their gov-
ernments. The Calvo Doctrine quickly became a 
Latin American doctrine and was incorporated 
into the political constitutions and domestic 
legislation of the countries of the region. At both 
the first American international conference, 
held in Washington in 1889-1890, and the 
second one held in Mexico in 1902, the Latin 
American countries adopted declarations and 
conventions which embodied the Calvo Doctrine 
(García Amador, 1981, p. 348, volume 1). More 
recently, this doctrine was used as the basis for 
the famous Tokyo "No", whereby the Latin 
American countries collectively refused to join 
the arbitration mechanism sponsored by the 
World Bank for the settlement of conflicts aris-
ing from foreign investments.2 
3. The Drago Doctrine 
The blockade of Venezuelan ports by Great Brit-
ain and Germany on 11 December 1902 had 
legal implications which completely changed re-
lations between creditor and debtor countries 
with respect to payment of the public debt. 
Venezuela had debts arising from indemnity 
claims for damages suffered by foreigners and 
from delays in payment of its external debt. In 
December 1902, the representatives of Great 
Britain and Germany presented an ultimatum, 
on behalf of their governments, demanding pay-
ment of their claims with no discussion whatsoev-
er. They further stated that refusal to accept the 
2The so-called Tokyo "No" was announced by the Chi-
lean delegate at the Annual Conference of the World Bank, 
on behalf of the Latin American countries members of the 
Bank. See Ruiz, 1964. 
ultimatum would lead to the beginning of 
hostilities. Venezuela responded by stating that it 
was going through a civil war and that once the 
situation returned to normal, it would deal with 
the claims. It then proposed that the question 
should be submitted to arbitration. The Eu-
ropean countries, supported by Italy, chose to 
ignore the offer of arbitration and impose a 
blockade on Venezuelan ports. On 29 December 
1902, after the blockade had begun, the Minister 
of Foreign Relations of Argentina, Luis Maria 
Drago, sent the Argentine Minister in Washing-
ton a note in which he expounded what is now 
known as the Drago Doctrine. 
Drago rejected the idea that relations be-
tween a private creditor and a private debtor 
were the same as those existing when the debtor 
was a sovereign State. In the first place, Drago 
supported the concept of the absolute sovereign-
ty of the State, according to which a creditor who 
enters into a contract with a sovereign entity real-
izes that no executive procedures can be initiated 
or enforced against it since that would com-
promise its very existence, doing away with the 
independence and action of the government in 
question. In the second place, Drago, quoting 
Hamilton, held that contracts between a nation 
and private individuals were binding according 
to the conscience of the sovereign and could not 
be the object of compulsive force (Pérez Triana, 
1908). 
Finally, using the Monroe Doctrine as his 
basis, Drago argued that the use of military force 
to secure payment of loans entailed territorial 
occupation and territorial occupation entailed 
the suppression or subordination of local gov-
ernments in those countries in which it was ap-
plied (Pérez Triana, 1908). 
Drago's note gave rise to intensive diplomatic 
consultations and was widely commented on by 
the international press; it did not, however, in-
fluence the sentence handed down by the Per-
manent Court of Arbitration of The Hague on 
22 February 1904. As Venezuela and the in-
tervening countries did not reach an agreement 
with respect to the form of payment of the obliga-
tions due, the parties submitted the matter to 
arbitration by the aforementioned Court. The 
Court decided that as between those countries 
which had used force to secure payment of their 
loans and those which had not done so (at least 
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eight countries were in the latter position), the 
former had priority. In other words, the Court, 
in this case, gave legitimacy to the use of force to 
secure payment of public debt (Scott, 1916, 
p. 55). 
Nevertheless, during the Second Peace Con-
ference, held at The Hague in 1907, the United 
States presented the "Porter proposition", which 
embodied the essence of the principles set forth 
by Drago, with, however, two significant mod-
ifications. In the first place, the Porter proposi-
tion only applied to contract debts, whereas the 
Drago Doctrine did not make such a distinction 
and hence applied to any pecuniary obligation of 
the State. In the second place, the Porter proposi-
tion required that the debtor show good faith 
and stipulated that such good faith would be 
deemed to be lacking if the debtor State rejected 
or failed to respond to an offer of arbitration or, 
having accepted such an offer, made it impos-
sible for the arbitration to begin or, once the sen-
tence had been handed down, refused to accept it 
(Pérez Triana, 1908, p. 88). 
The Porter proposition was included in the 
text of the Convention which limited the use of 
force for the recovery of contract debts adopted 
by The Hague Conference. Nevertheless, the 
Latin American countries were not satisfied, in-
asmuch as the principle as approved was not an 
absolute one and, moreover, the Convention 
provided for arbitration to settle matters which, 
according to the Calvo Doctrine, fell exclusively 
within the jurisdiction of the debtor country. 
On 23 December 1936, the non-intervention 
protocol was signed in Buenos Aires. This docu-
ment states that intervention, whether direct or 
indirect, and for whatever reason, by one con-
tracting party in the internal or external affairs 
of another party, is inadmissible (Article 1). 
Acceptance of the principle of non-intervention 
thus implied acceptance of the Drago Doctrine, 
inasmuch as it meant absolute rejection of the use 
of force to secure payment of a public debt. The 
prohibition against the threat or use of force by 
one State against another was also set forth, in 
broader terms, in the United Nations Charter 
(Article 2, paragraph 4) and in the Bogotá Char-
ter (Article 18). 
4. Reparations claimed after World War I 
There are surprising similarities between the 
current debt crisis and the so-called transfer prob-
lem of the 1920s, which was associated with the 
service of the debts arising from World War I 
(IDB, 1984b). Among the transfer problems, per-
haps none was so pertinent to the case of Latin 
America as that experienced by Germany, which 
culminated in one of the most serious financial 
crises ever suffered by any country. 
The Versailles Treaty justified the financial 
obligations imposed on the losing country by stat-
ing that Germany was solely responsible for start-
ing the war (Article 231) and establishing that 
that country must pay compensation for all the 
damage suffered by the civilian population of the 
Allied Countries... and their property during the 
war (Article 232). It further stipulated that Ger-
many must co-operate in the restoration of the 
economic and industrial life of those countries 
(Article 235). 
Most of the obligations imposed on Germany 
were not for a specified amount. It was left up to 
the so-called Reparations Commission created 
under the Treaty to translate them into liquid 
sums which could actually be demanded. This 
was not by accident; the Treaty dealt only with 
the punitive aspects of the responsibilities es-
tablished, but failed to determine the country's 
economic capacity to meet those responsibilities, 
although it did acknowledge the fact that Ger-
many's resources were inadequate to make com-
plete reparation for all losses and damages (Arti-
cle 232). 
In addition to paying reparations, Germany 
also had to make payments in kind. On 26 De-
cember 1922, the Reparations Commission ruled 
that Germany had failed to meet its obligation to 
deliver lumber to France. This circumstance was 
the basis for the occupation of the Ruhr by Bel-
gian and French troops, beginning on 11 Janu-
ary 1923, for the purpose of extracting timber 
directly and charging it against the German debt. 
This effort failed because the German people, 
supported by their Government, prevented it 
from being carried out. The Government also 
suspended payment of reparations, giving rise to 
one of the most spectacular inflations in the 
monetary history of the world.3 
3In January 1923, one dollar was worth 17 972 marks; 
on 14 November of the same year, it was worth more than one 
billion marks (Nussbaum, 1954). 
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The final amount of the reparations was only 
established in January 1930, at the equivalent of 
US$ 26 billion, to be paid in 60 installments up to 
1988 {Hemming, 1983, p. 339). By 1930, howev-
er, both the world economic situation and that of 
Germany made it impossible to service a debt of 
that magnitude. Some months later, the United 
States President declared a one-year moratorium 
of the payment of war debts by the allies and of 
reparations by Germany (Department of State, 
1931). 
From the practical standpoint, the payment 
of reparations was extinguished in June 1932, 
when the allies agreed to accept bonds in lieu of 
reparations. An intergovernmental organization 
—the Bank for International Settlements— was 
created especially to establish the date and terms 
of issuance of these bonds and to collect payment 
on them (Gathorne-Hardy, 1947). In addition, 
the allies, including Great Britain and France, 
also stopped making payments on their war debts 
with the United States. From 1931 onwards, 
these debts became merely symbolical; they were 
finally extinguished in 1933 (Flemming, 1938, 
p. 352). 
The German experience provides the 
following precedents which are applicable to the 
Latin American debt: 
a) There is no point in trying to find out who 
is to blame for the Latin American crisis; without 
question, the suggestion that the debtors alone 
are responsible for it and that only they should 
suffer the consequences is unacceptable. What is 
important is not to punish certain countries for 
the benefit of others —as was done in the case 
States meet their financial obligations not be-
cause of some binding legal rule requiring them 
to do so, but rather, according to Einzing (1973), 
because of their intention to borrow again. What 
worries creditors now, however, is the fact that 
there is no certainty this incentive can be main-
tained. The question is whether those banks that 
have already repeatedly risked their capital on 
of Germany— but rather to recognize that both 
the governments of the creditor countries and 
those of the debtor countries must share the 
consequences of the crisis and work together to 
solve it. 
b) There is a limit to the amount of financial 
resources a country can transfer abroad without 
seriously upsetting the living standards of its 
population and its social and political organiza-
tion. The example of Germany makes it un-
necessary to comment on the disruptions which 
could be caused in Latin American institutions if 
the current negative transfer of resources were 
to continue for a long time. 
c) The invasion of the Ruhr shows that the 
use of coercive measures as a method for obtain-
ing payment of a public debt only aggravates 
relations between countries and does not accom-
plish the objectives sought. At the present time, 
coercion may be more subtle (one expert has 
suggested converting the debt into capital and 
allowing creditors to become the owners of the 
productive natural resources of the debtor 
countries) (Wall Street Journal, 1984). 
d) The final solution which the creditor 
countries found to the problem of German repa-
rations, which consisted in replacing reparations 
by bonds administered by an intergovernmental 
agency, has positive features which could be stud-
ied with a view to applying them to the Latin 
American case. The possibility of converting a 
variable and constantly increasing debt into a 
fixed debt at a term compatible with the pay-
ment capacity of the debtor country would 
appear to have definite advantages (Guerguil, 
1984). 
loans to Latin America can continue offering the 
incentive of new loans to the region. 
In light of the above, it is important to con-
sider what might happen if a government stop-
ped its payments or refused to fulfil its in-
ternational financial obligations. As is well 
known, this question falls within the more gener-
al issue of the international responsibility of 
II 
The international financial responsibility of the State 
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States, on which there is wide disagreement in 
international law. Since the 1930 codification 
conference held at The Hague, the serious dif-
ferences in this regard have made it impossible 
to advance towards the adoption of rules or prin-
ciples. Moreover, the United Nations In-
ternational Law Commission, which in 1956 was 
charged with drawing up a draft convention on 
State responsibility has not yet fulfilled this man-
date. 
Despite the fact that there are no imperative 
norms governing the international financial 
responsibility of the State or establishing whether 
its obligations with a foreign private creditor are 
subject to public or private international law,4 as 
regards changes in the political system, there are 
some important precedents which are worth 
mentioning. 
1. Recognition of the obligations 
of previous governments 
Except in the case of the Cuban revolution and 
other less important ones, the Latin American 
countries have, from the time they gained in-
dependence and up to the Sandinista revolution, 
been absolutely consistent in the practice of 
recognizing the financial obligations undertaken 
by previous governments. 
Latin American practice followed the princi-
ples of the first French Republic, which in its 
Political Constitution stated that it accepted and 
recognized the debts contracted by the deposed 
monarchy. The principles applied by France and 
Latin America are based on the theory of the 
permanent identity of the State and the continu-
ity which must exist between governments and 
the obligations they contract. Whenever a gov-
ernment has repudiated the debts of its pre-
decessor, it has applied a casuistic criterion based 
on the presumption that the debt was an illegiti-
mate one or was used for illegitimate purposes. 
Even before their independence had been 
recognized, the Spanish American republics, 
through their legislatures, solemny accepted and 
4Schuster (1973) points out that the law applicable to a 
contract between a State and a foreign private contractor is 
not absolutely clear; he quotes Jean-Flavien La Rive {1965, 
p. 265), who states that the law applicable to an interna-
tional contract is a controversial and complex matter. 
gave priority to the debts previously contracted 
by Spain in connection with its territories. Sub-
sequently, in the treaties whereby the republics 
were recognized, they again expressly accepted 
responsibility for meeting the financial obliga-i 
tions previously contracted by Spain.5 
The above precedents have been repeated 
many times. As an illustration we shall only men-
tion the cases of Brazil in 1889 and Nicaragua in 
1979. 
When the Federal Republic of Brazil was 
established, rumors were started abroad which 
affected the new regime's credit and even gave 
the impression that a new positivistic calendar 
was to be imposed, thus making it necessary for 
the government to clarify its position vis-à-vis the 
international banks. The Minister of Finance, 
Ruy Barbosa, thus sent his historic telegram, 
which read as follows: "Government has been 
constituted as the Republic of the United States 
of Brazil. Monarchy deposed. Imperial family 
left the country. Provinces join. General peace 
and satisfaction. Executive branch governing 
provisionally... Republic strictly respects all com-
mitments, obligations and contracts of the State" 
(Mangabeira, 1960, p. 43). 
The precedent set by Nicaragua is important 
because the new Government, shortly after 
taking over, stated that it would not recognize, 
because of its illegitimate nature, debts con-
tracted by the previous régime for the purchase 
of weapons or those on which disbursements had 
not yet entered the country (United Nations, 
1979). It later changed this position in favour of 
the doctrine of complete recognition. 
2. Repudiation of the obligations 
of a previous government 
The classical example of repudiation is that of 
5Moore ( 1906, pp. 342 and 343) quotes Article vu of the 
Treaty of 16 February 1840 with Ecuador; Article xi of the 
Treaty of 9 October 1841 with Uruguay; Article îv of the 
Treaty of 25 April 1844 with Chile; Article v of the Treaty of 
30 May 1845 with Venezuela; Articles v of the Treaties of 21 
July 1847, 10 May 1850 and 25 July 1850 with Bolivia, Costa 
Rica and Nicaragua, respectively; Article îv of the Treaty of 9 
July 1859 with the Argentine Confederation and of 21 Sep-
tember 1863 with the Argentine Republic; Articles iv of the 
Treaty of 29 May 1863 with Guatemala and of the Treaty of 
24 June 1865 with El Salvador. 
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the Soviet Union which, by a decree dated 10 
February 1918, declared that: 
1. All State loans contracted by the gov-
ernments of the large landholders and 
bourgeoisie of Russia... are annulled. The 
December coupons for those loans will not be 
honoured; 
2. The guarantees granted by those gov-
ernments for loans made by different enter-
prises and institutions are also annulled; and 
3. All foreign loans are annulled without ex-
ception and inconditionally (Langsam). 
Nevertheless, the Soviet Government grad-
ually changed its position over the years that 
followed. During a conference held at Genoa in 
1922, the Soviet delegation sent Great Britain a 
note stating that it could not accept responsibility 
for the debts of its predecessors so long as its 
Government was not formally recognized de jure 
by the Powers concerned (Wilson, 1934, p. 26). It 
thus suggested that payment of its public debts 
was subject to de jure recognition of the Soviet 
Government by the Western Powers. 
The Soviet suggestion was quickly rewarded 
with recognition by the Labour Government, on 
the grounds that, although technically separate 
from the issue of recognition one of the most 
The financing obtained from the London Eu-
rodollar market has certain characteristics which 
make it different from conventional transac-
tions. This is due to the special nature of the 
Eurodollar market, to the way in which the 
participating banks (organized in consortia) op-
erate and to the standard loan contracts used. 
1. The Eurodollar market 
From the legal point of view, there are three 
characteristics of this market which are worth 
stressing. 
important questions was the settlement of out-
standing claims between the Governments and 
nationals of the two countries and the restoration 
of Russia's credit (Toynbee, 1926). 
Payment of the Russian debt to the United 
States was also conditioned on recognition of the 
Soviet Union; one of the methods agreed on by 
the Governments in 1933 to facilitate settlement 
was the transfer or assignment to the United 
States Government of the stocks or rights held by 
the Soviet Government, as a successor to pre-
vious Russian Governments, on properties or 
goods in the United States. The execution of this 
transfer to the United States Government gave 
rise to several lawsuits. In one of its decisions, the 
Supreme Court ruled that recognition of the 
Soviet Union was retroactive and validated all 
action and conduct of that Government from the 
beginning of its existence.6 
Subsequently, the Foreign Claims Settle-
ment Commission assumed responsibility for col-
lecting all monies owed or potentially owed to the 
United States Government as assignee of the 
rights transferred to it under the Litvinoff 
Agreement of 1933.7 In practical terms, howev-
er, the bulk of the Russian debt outstanding prior 
to the repudiation decree remains unpaid and 
will probably never be paid. 
In the first place, there is a complete lack of 
regulation on the part of any governmental or 
intergovernmental body; this is, in fact, the very 
reason why this market exists. The absence of 
regulation extends not only to individual op-
erations but also to the operations of associated 
banks. 
In practical terms, the lack of regulation 
means that a bank is not subject to the restrictions 
6United States v. Belmont (301 U.S. 324) (1937). 
7
 Settlement of International Claims, Act 96-209 (1980); the 
original version is dated 1949. 
Ill 
Characteristics of the financing obtained from the 
Eurodollar market 
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usually imposed on banking activities by national 
legislation. T h e most critical such requirement is 
that which concerns the reserves a bank must 
keep in respect of its operations ; the banks taking 
part in the Eurodollar market are not subject to 
this requirement. 
In the second place, there is the large volume 
of interbank loans and deposits which allow for 
the rapid transfer of resources from one bank to 
another with no other formality than a telephone 
call. Thus, when a bank grants a loan, it may use 
its own resources or, depending on circum-
stances, resources borrowed from other banks. 
This flexibility in the mobilization of resources 
enables the banks to meet a large demand quickly 
bu t , at the same t ime, i t means that non-
compliance by one single bank can jeopardize the 
working of the entire system. This vulnerability 
became evident during the Mexican crisis of 
1982, when six banks —Bancomer, Banamex, 
Banco Serfin, Commermex, Somex and Banco 
Internacional— which had agencies in the Lon-
don interbank market, were unable, for several 
days, to meet their deposit obligations with other 
banks. According to one journalist, if those 
accounts had been frozen..., the entire interbank 
market could have collapsed and the effect in 
London and, probably, New York would have 
been devastating (Kraft, 1984). Fortunately, the 
Mexican crisis was solved, to the great relief of' 
the London and New York financiers. 
Finally, the Eurodollar market has its own 
rules for establishing the London Interbank 
Offered Rate (LIBOR) of interest. This rate repre-
sents the amount which a bank operating on the 
London interbank market pays to another bank 
operating on the same market for a Eurodollar 
deposit for a term of not longer than one year. 
LIBOR is determined by the quotation given by the 
so-called reference banks participating in a loan 
transaction at a given hour on a contractually 
pre-established date for determining the applic-
able interest rates, which is usually paid every 
three or six months. Thus, LIBOR is a variable 
interest rate which fluctuates according to the 
market in London. Debtors pay a fixed per-
centage (spread), which is negotiated in each 
case, over LIBOR. 
This explains why the Latin American debt 
fluctuates periodically; it has been contracted at 
the variable LIBOR interest rates or at the United 
States prime rate (the interest rate United States 
banks charge their best customers), which reflect 
the fluctuations on the London and United 
States markets. 
T h e Latin American governments would 
like to see some government assume responsibil-
ity for the activities of the creditor banks and act 
as a counterpart in negotiations pertaining to the 
debt. As is well known, up to now, the creditor 
countries have not done anything to satisfy this 
desire. This is in contrast with what has hap-
pened in the case of private-sector obligations in 
some countries, where, when debtors have had 
difficulty making payments, the creditors have 
obtained a government guarantee on the obliga-
tions, despite the fact that many of them have 
involved speculative or fraudulent operations 
which were harmful to the national economy. 
The banks have succeeded in obtaining this State 
guarantee by pressuring the governments, which 
had initially refused. One particularly effective 
form of pressure was the reduction or elimina-
tion of short-term loans (ECLAC, 1984, p. 74). 
2. The consortia 
The granting of loans by banks organized in con-
sortia —another result of the lack of regulation 
of the London market— became a widespread 
practice beginning in 1972, when a total of 
US$ 11 billion were loaned under this type of 
arrangement. The use of this system increased so 
dramatically that by 1981, syndicated loans to-
talled US$ 178 billion (Mac Donald, 1982). 
The consortia were successful because they 
made it possible to channel resources for an 
amount larger than that which any individual 
bank could loan, thus proportionally reducing 
the risk to each member of the consortium. Thus, 
they were quite successful during the periods of 
liquidity prior to the crisis and offered advan-
tages to governments which, th rough this 
mechanism, found it relatively easy to obtain 
medium-term (from five to seven years and 
more) loans for amounts which up to then were 
unprecedented for Latin America.8 
Nevertheless, as soon as difficulties began to 
arise in connection with the service of these loans, 
8So-called "jumbo" loans were for amounts in excess ot 
USf 1 billion. 
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the debtor governments virtually lost their 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the consortia. A con-
sortium is organized through a mandate-letter 
from the loan applicant authorizing a bank to act' 
as the lead manager bank in forming the con-
sortium. At the same time, the applicant sends a 
memorandum giving detailed information on his 
economic and financial situation; this is very im-
portant because if it is later discovered that the 
memorandum contains false information, the 
creditors may even demand payment of the total 
amount outstanding on the loan.9 Both docu-
ments (the mandate-letter and the information 
memorandum) enable the lead bank to invite 
other banks to participate in the formation of a 
consortium. The consortium establishes a sepa-
rate legal relationship which is independent of 
the loan contract between the lead bank and the 
borrower. 
The consortium reflects the sophisticated 
organizational capability and the institutional 
solidarity of the banks. Contractually, it is strength-
ened by a cross-default clause which entitles a 
creditor to demand payment of the entire bal-
ance on the loan whenever the debtor has failed 
to meet a Financial obligation with another credi-
tor. Through this clause, therefore, the banking 
system obtains additional protection which pre-
vents a debtor from choosing to meet only some 
obligations and not others. The cross-default 
clause prevents him from making this choice and 
forces him to meet each and every one of his 
obligations. 
3. The loan contract 
Loan contracts granted under the rules of the 
London interbank market have certain unique 
features which makes them different from any 
other contract. They are drafted in standard lan-
guage which reflects the many years of ex-
perience of the banks operating in this market. 
Consequently, the possibility of modifying these 
contracts is very remote. 
Of the different clauses contained in these 
loan contracts, we shall now discuss those relating 
^ h e so-called "Colocotronis" lawsuit of 1975, between 
United States banks and the lead bank, European American 
Bank, involved allegations of falsehood in the information 
memorandum (Mac Donald, 1982, p. 126). 
to the payment of commissions and expenses, 
jurisdiction and the applicable law. 
a) Commissions and expenses 
In addition to paying interest, a borrower 
must pay a number of commissions and mis-
cellaneous expenses which considerably increase 
the cost of financing. Commissions include the 
management fee, which consists of a fixed per-
centage over the total amount borrowed and 
which must be paid to the agent bank at the time 
of signature of the contract. The purpose of this 
fee is to cover the expenses and effort involved in 
organizing the consortium. 
The commitment commission is an annual 
percentage paid on the undisbursed balance of 
the loan during the entire period in which the 
bank keeps the resources available. In this re-
gard, it should be noted that the contracts in-
clude many prerequisites which must be met be-
fore the funds are actually disbursed. The bor-
rower must pay the commitment commission un-
til disbursement is actually made. 
The agency fee is paid annually to the agent 
bank for services provided during the disburse-
ment period. It also is a fixed percentage. 
In addition, the borrower must reimburse 
the banks for specific expenditures incurred in 
organizing the financing. These include services 
such as travel expenses, communications, postal 
expenses, lawyers' fees, advertising, preparation 
and printing of the information memorandum 
and others. 
b) Jurisdiction and applicable law 
Depending on where the financing comes 
from and where the banks have their domicile, 
the law applicable for purposes of interpreting 
and executing the contract will usually be that of 
the United Kingdom or of the State of New York. 
For the same reasons, the contract stipulates that 
the courts of those same places shall settle any 
controversy or dispute arising between the par-
ties, without prejudice to the creditor's always 
having the option of claiming his rights before 
the courts of the borrower's country. The ju-
risdiction clause also includes the designation by 
the debtor of a representative holding power of 
attorney to receive claims and a waiver of im-
munity in respect of the initiation of lawsuits and 
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the execution of sentences. Difficult questions 
have arisen as regards the validity of these stip-
ulations on jurisdiction and the applicable law, 
inasmuch as the constitutional and legal pro-
visions in force in most Latin American countries 
prohibit, in different ways, the settlement of 
public affairs by jurisdictions other than the 
national ones. Infringement of these provisions 
is usually sanctioned by annulment of the act. 
This also gives rise to a political problem 
which Aldo Ferrer (1984) mentions in stating 
that negotiations on the external debt should be 
transferred from London or New York to 
Buenos Aires, Mexico or Rio de Janeiro. Aside 
from the political issue involved, it must be recog-
nized that the banks will never agree to a financ-
ing contract which grants the debtor the power to 
decide which law or jurisdiction is applicable. In 
practical terms, therefore, the debtor has no 
choice in the matter. 
It should also be noted that many of the legal 
requirements imposed by the Latin American 
countries in this regard are extreme, considering 
the realities of contemporary finance. The gov-
ernments and central banks are undoubtedly 
aware of this fact and have interpreted the law in 
such a way as to allow for flexibility in the applica-
tion of the relevant constitutional norms. 
An example of this is the interpretation de-
veloped by the Attorney General of Venezuela 
(1977, pp. 55 ff.), who considered Article 127 of 
the Constitution to be inapplicable to loan con-
tracts between the public sector and foreign pri-
vate banks, because those contracts had to do 
with commercial activities which did not affect 
the security and sovereignty of the State. 
Without prejudice to collection by legal means, 
United States legislation grants banks a right 
which, in practice, is perhaps more expeditious 
than a lawsuit; it allows creditors to apply the 
liquid amounts deposited in checking accounts to 
the payment of amounts owed by their customers 
for other purposes. This set-off right allows cred-
itor banks to retain and collect directly the 
Another example is that of the Federal Court 
of Comodoro Rivadavia, which reversed the de-
cision of the judge of Río Gallegos preventing the 
extension of jurisdiction to foreign courts in re-
spect of contracts pertaining to the renegotiation 
of the external debt of the Argentine Republic.10 
In this significant decision, the Court made a 
distinction between federal jurisdiction in re-
spect of the party and federal jurisdiction in re-
spect of the matter, and concluded that federal 
jurisdiction in respect of the party could be ex-
tended, even though the party might be the 
Argentine State. Bidart Campos added, in a foot-
note, that the extension agreed on was in order 
because there did not seem to be any federal 
matter at issue. 
Moreover, it is questionable whether a gov-
ernment can free itself of its contractual obliga-
tions by invoking non-compliance with its own 
legislation and arguing, for example, that a con-
tract has violated the constitutional prohibition 
against submitting to a foreign law or jurisdic-
tion. Once a contract has been signed and dis-
bursements have begun, such a behaviour would 
be equivalent to repudiation without just cause. 
On this point, Borchard (1951, p. 120) mentions 
the case of a loan granted by United States banks 
to Bolivia and the communication which the 
United States Secretary of State sent to the 
Bolivian Minister stating that, leaving aside the 
question of the legality of the loan, the State 
Department wished to draw attention to the fact 
that the Government of Bolivia, after having 
accepted and used the product of the loan, 
was hardly in a position to argue later that the 
loan was illegal.11 
amounts owed them on delinquent loans from 
the liquid product of the exports of debtor 
lQRevista argentina de jurisprudencia, decision of 8 Octo-
ber 1983 in lawsuit against Aerolíneas Argentinas. In his 
decision, the judge of Río Gallegos also ordered the arrest of 
the President of the Central Bank of Argentina. 
1
 'The State Department communication, dated 9 April 
1922, ¡s reproduced in Foreign Relations, 1923, i, p. 443. 
IV 
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countries which are on deposit in those same 
banks (Mayer and Odorrizi, 1982, p. 289). 
In the context of the current crisis, both cred-
itors and debtors realize that there are no im-
mediate solutions and that a lawsuit would entail 
many risks which none of the parties wishes to 
take. 
The Mexican crisis of 1982 showed, more-
over, that the problems related to the Latin Amer-
ican debt, and especially those of the larger 
countries, can affect the viability of the in-
ternational financial system and that, therefore, 
the banks cannot be allowed, on their own, to 
decide how they should be solved. Indeed 
—although the principle of a political solution 
has not yet been accepted by the creditor coun-
tries^ — the Mexican crisis was resolved through 
intergovernmental negotiations which involved, 
among many others, the United States Treasury 
Department and Federal Reserve Bank, the 
Bank of England, the International Monetary 
Fund and the Bank for International Settle-
ments. 
Nevertheless, because the solution to the 
Mexican crisis of 1982 did not provide a prec-
edent that could be applied to other countries, 
nor have the creditor countries accepted the pro-
posal set forth in the Cartagena Declaration to 
the effect that an overall political solution should 
be sought for the problem of the debt, the banks 
still have ample room for exercising their rights 
without taking long- or medium-term political 
considerations into account. 
When a debtor defaults on his financial 
obligations, the banks have the option of suing 
for payment or renegotiating the debt. In gener-
al, they have co-ordinated their action in exercis-
ing these options, going even so far as to set up 
steering committees organized vertically under 
the chairmanship of one of the more powerful 
banks. We shall now look at these two options. 
1. Judicial collection of the public debt 
It is important to determine whether the lawsuit 
is brought before the courts of the country in 
which the debt was contracted or payment is to be 
made, or the courts of the debtor's country. In 
either case, what makes the situation with respect 
to the collection of the Latin American debt un-
ique is the high amount involved. Theoretically, 
under the private law of most of the countries 
concerned, when a debtor does not pay, the 
courts are required to order the attachment and 
auction of the goods and assets of the debtor 
the creditor's claim. In other words, in the 
hypothetical case that the banks should succeed 
in having the courts order the attachment and 
auction for the goods and assets of the debtor 
governments and public entities in order to satis-
fy the entire amount owed, virtually the entire 
productive sector of Latin America and a good 
part of its territory would come under the owner-
ship of the creditor transnational banks. There 
are many reasons why such a situation cannot 
arise. Because the State is a member of the in-
ternational community, its existence or opera-
tion cannot validly be discussed or restricted by 
the jurisdiction of another State and much less so 
in connection with proceedings to secure pay-
ment of private loans. 
If a State does not pay its debt, therefore, a 
creditor cannot initiate execution proceedings 
that might lead it to bankruptcy. This principle is 
recognized in the domestic legislation of the in-
dividual countries, as well as in international law. 
United States legislation, for example, expressly 
makes bankruptcy proceedings inapplicable to 
States.12 At the international level, The Hague 
Court ruled, in the case of Venezuela, that the 
property of a State could not be the object of 
proceedings leading to sequestration or attach-
ment and that such a proceeding would be in-
consistent with the existence of a State as an in-
dependent entity. It further stated that it was 
obvious, therefore, that bankruptcy proceedings 
could not be applied to States in the same way as 
they were applied to individuals or commercial 
societies.13 
Although this principle is quite clear, it is 
difficult to apply it in practice because of the 
increasing involvement of States in commercial 
activities and the development, in the United 
Kingdom and the United States —among other 
countries— of the doctrine of restricted immun-
ity of jurisdiction. 
12US Bankruptcy Code, n U.S.C., chapter 9, paras. 901-
906; supplement iv-1980. 
''Arbitration between Venezuela and other countries, 
Permanent Arbitration Court of The Hague, 1903, quoted by 
Borchard(1951,p. 122). 
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As a result of these developments, loans con-
tracted by foreign States in those countries are 
considered to be commercial in nature; hence, it 
is not possible to invoke immunity of jurisdiction 
or of execution in lawsuits brought in cases of 
default. The creditors, however, are able to use 
all the resources permitted by the legislation of 
those countries, including the attachment, with-
holding, sequestration or auction of goods. 
Nevertheless, if the debtor countries do not have 
a sufficient amount of goods in the aforemen-
tioned countries to satisfy their overdue debts, 
creditors will not accomplish much through this 
means. At any rate, the question is a difficult one, 
since a significant part of Latin American trade is 
transacted through London and New York 
banks and thus the bank accounts in question can 
easily be attached in those countries.14 
The other stage in this hypothesis is a lawsuit 
before the courts of the debtor countries where, 
obviously, there are enough goods to justify such 
a request. This might involve bringing suit be-
fore the local courts or requesting enforcement 
of a decision of a foreign court. In either case, the 
creditor's request will only succeed to the extent 
that it is compatible with local legislation. Even 
so, a distinction would have to be made between 
an isolated suit for a specific and relatively mod-
erate amount and a suit for large amounts. In the 
first case, there should be no difficulty in effect-
ing collection, but in the second case, if the 
amount claimed is beyond the payment capacity 
of the State, the situation will be different. 
For obvious reasons of public order and 
national sovereignty, the courts of a country can-
not make decisions which would affect or restrict 
the State's ability freely to dispose of its goods or 
the normal functioning and operation of es-
sential economic activities, in order to favour 
foreign private creditors. The idea put forth by 
some creditors of capitalizing the Latin Amer-
ican debt by converting their loans into tangible 
assets is not, therefore, legally feasible. Nor have 
the banks considered this feasible; hence they 
have had to realize that the only valid option is a 
periodical renegotiation of the debt. 
14Among the many cases that have occurred in recent 
months, one may mention the attachment of four Bolivian 
Government accounts in Washington banks (UPI, January 14, 
1985). 
2. Renegotiation of the debt 
It is clear from the above that, in the context of 
the current crisis, this has been the best alterna-
tive available. Without prejudice to this, and de-
spite the adverse circumstances, the exceptional 
organizational capacity of the banks has enabled 
them successfully to manage these renegotiations 
in such a way that, up to now, the crisis has not 
significantly affected their financial interests. 
Up to 1981, the annual average debt of the 
developing countries with the commercial banks 
which was restructured was under US$ 1.5 bil-
lion; in 1982 this figure rose to US$ 5 billion and 
in 1983, it was over US$ 60 billion (IMP, 1983, pp. 
22 ff.). These figures are an indication of the 
high priority that has been attached, from 1983 
onwards, to questions pertaining to the 
renegotiation of the debt of developing coun-
tries, and particularly of the Latin American 
debt. 
The question arises whether, in view of the 
tremendous importance of the renegotiation 
process, the countries have received or are 
receiving the technical and professional advice 
they need in order to handle these complicated 
operations successfully. We believe that in the 
case of many Latin American countries, this has 
definitely not been the case. This is confirmed by 
a commentary in the Financial Times, which states 
that the developing countries have great advan-
tages vis-à-vis the private banks, but have shown 
little imagination in using them.15 Whether or 
not this is true, the suggestion that the countries 
should request international technical co-
operation in order to strengthen their bargain-
ing capacity vis-à-vis the banks would seem to be 
fully justified. 
The banks, on the other hand, have used to 
advantage many resources, including the follow-
ing; acting under the leadership of a single com-
mittee presided over by one of the more power-
ful banks; keeping negotiations separate, dealing 
with them on a case-by-case basis; conducting 
negotiations and signing contracts at the sites of 
their main offices (London or New York); using 
English as the official language for renegotia-
tions and contracts; using highly sophisticated 
l5Editorial entitled "Third World Leverage", dated 12 
February 1983, quoted by Devlin (1983). 
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legal and financial advice at practically no cost; 
and applying as a precedent for the terms and 
financial conditions of their negotiations with 
other countries those agreed on with Mexico in 
1982. 
Recent studies show that the renegotiations 
carried out by the countries of the region be-
tween 1978 and 1983 have several characteristics 
in common (IMF, 1983; Devlin, 1983; and ECLAC, 
1984). 
That is why the rescheduling of the Mexican 
debt in 1982 is so important as a model applied to 
other countries. Nevertheless, what was accept-
able to Mexico in 1982 is not necessarily accept-
able now to countries with serious structural prob-
lems, whose possibilities for achieving a true 
recovery —contrary to the case of Mexico— are 
remote. Hence, it does not seem right for pre-
cedents or models that are not based on the 
specific economic circumstances of each debtor 
country to be applied to current renegotiations. 
The recommendation made by the United States 
Congress upon approving the last increase in IMF 
capital is consistent with this view. The Congress 
stated that the annual service of the external debt 
required of a given country should represent a 
wise and reasonable percentage of the estimated 
annual export income of the country in 
question.l6 
As we shall see, however, in the past few 
years, renegotiations have been based exclusively 
on the conditions prevailing on the international 
markets and not on those existing in the debtor 
countries. 
Some of the main features of the renegotia-
tion are the following: 
a) Concepts 
The banks consider that the debt should be 
refinanced and defined as a separate transaction 
from the original one, thus replacing the pre-
vious obligation by a new one. This strategy 
allows the banks to obtain more favourable terms 
because of the obvious reduction in the bargain-
ing power of the debtor —who is virtually in 
default— and the great reduction in the supply 
of credit to Latin America (ECLAC, 1984). 
"Rescheduling" or "restructuring", on the 
16Public Act 98/181, quoted in ECLAC, 1984, p. 73. 
other hand, consists of extending or delaying the 
periods allowed for amortization and interest 
payments or reducing the amount of a particular 
obligation. The difference between these latter 
arrangements and that described as refinancing 
is not purely semantic; rather, there is a fun-
damental difference for both parties concerned. 
Up to now, the banks have managed to impose 
the concept of refinancing so that loans which 
originally were only marginally profitable have 
become highly profitable transactions. 
Following the oil crisis of 1973, when there 
was an excess supply, and the banks were rushing 
to lend to the Latin American countries, these 
countries could practically choose the best offer, 
thus forcing the banks to reduce the interest 
spread —in other words, their profits— to 
minimal amounts. Since 1982, when the supply 
of credit ended, countries coming to the bargain-
ing table have simply had to do whatever the 
banks tell them to. Through refinancing, the 
banks are now able to increase the spread and 
thus obtain profits which up to then had only 
been dubious. Refinancing also favours the 
banks because it allows them to again charge 
commissions and reimbursement of mis-
cellaneous expenditures on the amount of 
obligations refinanced. 
b) Relationship with the Fund 
After an unsuccessful experiment in which a 
consortium of banks tried, in 1976, to engage in 
direct supervision of an economic stabilization 
plan for Peru, debt renegotiations have been sub-
ject to the signature, by the country concerned, 
of an economic stabilization plan with the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (Dammers, 1984, p. 
83; Akhund, 1978, pp. 66-72). 
At present, renegotiations with the banks 
even consider non-compliance with the Fund 
agreement as grounds for claiming non-
compliance with the loan agreement. 
Since the Mexican crisis of 1982, Fund in-
tervention in debt renegotiation has become 
even more significant. On that occasion, the 
Fund took the bold step of requiring the banks to 
participate and, in practice, it required the banks 
to grant new loans to Mexico amounting to 1% of 
the amount they had already committed; the to-
tal amount loaned in this way was US$ 5 billion. 
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At the same time, the banks had to renegotiate 
US$ 20 billion of the debt which matured in 1983 
and 1984 (Kraft, 1984, p. 49). Although the new 
loans and the renegotiation had been granted at 
the instigation of the Fund, or, to be more exact, 
of its Director, Mr. Larosiere, this did not mean 
that the banks did not get a fabulous deal; they 
earned from 70 to 90% over their capital, so that 
the restructuring turned into a very good busi-
ness for them.17 
c) Exclusion of interest 
For many reasons, the banks have systemati-
cally refused to include interest payments 
—either currently due or future— in debt re-
negotiations. They have no problem, however, 
with refinancing capital payments. In proceed-
ing thus, they are following a banking tradition, 
i.e., to keep money in circulation. Moreover, if 
under the present circumstances, the entire 
amount of the debt were to be paid, the banks 
would have serious difficulties in relending that 
money. As long as countries continue paying in-
terest, the banks are able to reassure their 
stockholders and the authorities that everything 
is normal. 
Non-payment of interest on a bank loan has 
different administrative and legal implications in 
the United States. From a bookkeeping point of 
view, the transaction must necessarily be re-
corded as non-performing and withdrawn from 
assets. Generally, this also means that there will 
be no dividend payment, a fact which must be 
reflected in quarterly reports to stockholders. 
Hence, the banks need to give an appearence of 
normality to their operations; this is why they 
prefer to grant new loans rather than to include 
interest payments in a refinancing arrangement. 
As a result, despite the fact that defaults have 
occurred on a large scale, the banks have seen to 
it that interest payments continue without in-
terruption. Thus, they have established a sort of 
perpetual rent in their favour which, theoretical-
ly, could continue indefinitely, since, as far as the 
banks are concerned, they are not interested in 
seeing interest payments suspended and, as far 
as the debtors are concerned, up to now they 
have had no choice. 
''Attributed to one of the Mexican negotiation (see 
Kraft, 1984, p. 52). 
d) Maturities included 
One of the fictions which the banks have 
insisted on maintaining is that of the temporary 
and exceptional nature of debt rescheduling. 
Thus, each case of non-performance is treated 
individually, without taking into account the 
overall crisis affecting the region. This strategy is 
designed to gain time, on the assumption that in a 
few years, an overall recovery will enable the 
debtor to meet his obligations in a normal man-
ner. According to this criterion, the reschedul-
ings that have actually been carried out only in-
clude maturities falling within periods of no 
more than 12 months. Naturally, this means 
ignoring the structural aspects of the crisis and, 
moreover, helps to aggravate it; after two years, 
the debtors will be in even deeper troubles, since 
they will then have to meet new maturities, as well 
as the old ones. 
e) Financial conditions in recent negotiations 
A study was recently made of 43 negotiations 
on debt restructuring with 28 countries. This 
study, carried out from 1978 to October 1983, 
showed that the negotiations all had the follow-
ing features in common:18 
—The renegotiations were closely linked to 
IMF adjustment programmes and the banks were 
organized into directing committees. 
—The long- and medium-term debt con-
tracted or guaranteed by the public sector was 
included; in exceptional cases, the long- or 
medium-term private debt was included. 
—The short-term debt was only included in 
half the cases. 
—The interbank debt was excluded, as re-
gards both deposits and loans. 
—In some cases, notes or floating interest 
rates were included; in others, the agreement 
only included bonds and notes at floating interest 
rates of financial institutions. 
—The agreements usually covered maturi-
ties (capital) falling within the 12 months after 
the initiation of negotiations. 
—Except in two cases, the agreements ex-
cluded from negotiation interest already due or 
future interest. 
"information taken from IMF (1983, pp. 25 ff.). The 
information refers to debt renegotiations of 28 countries, 15 
of which are in Latin America. 
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—Debt consolidation periods, understood as 
the period between the maturity of the original 
debt being restructured and the payment date of 
the future debt, ranged between one and two 
years; in the case of the debt that was already due, 
repayment periods were extended up to a little 
over three years. 
—With only four exceptions, the agreements 
covered 80% of the capital maturing during the 
consolidation period and, in more than half the 
cases, 100% of the capital. 
—Amortization terms for payment of the 
restructured debt ranged between 5 and 7 years. 
—In most cases, interest rates were based on 
the three- or six-month dollar rates under LIBOR. 
In some cases, however, interest rates were based 
on the LIBOR rate or on the United States prime 
rate, the choice being up to the creditor. 
—The margin applied to the basic LIBOR in-
terest rate or to the prime rate ranged between 
1.75% and 2.25% (only in one case was it 2.5%). 
Restructuring commissions were estimated 
on the basis of limited information. They ranged 
between 1% and 1.5% of the amounts restruc-
tured. 
f) The case of Nicaragua 
The renegotiation of the Nicaraguan debt, 
which was carried out in 1980, has certain 
unique features which make it different from 
all o ther cases. In almost every regard, the 
agreement breaks with all precedents in matters 
of renegotiation. 
T h e fear that the new government might 
repudiate the previous government's debt was 
Recent decisions handed down by United States 
courts in lawsuits brought by transnational banks 
against Latin American public bodies that had 
defaulted on their loans make it necessary to 
mention the doctrines on which these decisions 
have been based. 
quite justified in 1979. Thus, when, in December 
1979, at a meeting held at the Mexican Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of the In-
ternational Reconstruction Fund of Nicaragua 
acknowledged the debt, the bankers were re-
lieved (Ugarteche, 1983, p. 192). 
For purposes of renegotiation, the debt was 
divided into four parts and, contrary to custom, 
negotiations were begun in Mexico and con-
cluded in Panama. None of the meetings were 
held in New York or London. Although the 
banks wished to impose market conditions and 
market interest rates (Ugarteche, 1983, p. 193), 
they recognized that the situation was such that it 
was both necessary and right to allow for con-
ditions that were less harsh than usual.19 
T h e banks' original proposal was to grant a 
two-year grace period and a five-year amortiza-
tion period, at a rate of 1.75% over LIBOR. Nica-
ragua's counter-offer was 23 years for amortiza-
tion. 
The final agreement represents one of the 
most favourable renegotiations obtained by a 
debtor country in recent years. The refinancing 
included interest due since 1978, calculated at a 
rate of 10.875%; when the LIBOR rate at that 
moment was 20%. Nicaragua was to pay an inter-
est rate of 7% during the first five years and the 
market rate from 1986 onwards. 
Another innovation was the provision that, 
instead of including capital maturities of 1 or 2 
years, as was the rule, the entire debt was restruc-
tured. 
The amortization period was 12 years in-
stead of 5 or 7 and no rescheduling fee was 
charged (Ugarteche, 1983). 
These doctrines were developed a long time 
ago; however, in light of the increase in trans-
national activity and the conflicts which have in-
19Ugarteche, 1983, p. 193. The expression is attributed 
to the economist Richard Wemert. 
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evitably arisen from the interaction of different 
systems, they have become increasingly im-
portant since the 1964 Supreme Court decision 
in the Sabbatino case.20 
The doctrines on which these court decisions 
have been based, which are also closely in-
terrelated, are the act of state doctrine and the 
doctrine of immunity of jurisdiction. 
1. The act of state doctrine 
Under this doctrine, the courts refrain from de-
ciding on a question submitted to them when this 
would involve qualifying the validity of a public 
act by a foreign government within its territory 
and jurisdiction. 
The doctrine was originally conceived on 
grounds of courtesy and international respect 
for the public acts of other States. Subsequently, 
however, the courts' refusal to decide on such 
cases was based on the problems involved in in-
terfering in the area of foreign relations. 
In the United States, the concept was first 
developed in 1897 as a result of a claim brought 
by a United States citizen before the courts of his 
country against the military government of 
Venezuela, because of his arrest and illegal im-
prisonment.22 His claim was rejected on the 
grounds that every sovereign State was obliged to 
respect the independence of all sovereign States 
and the courts of a country could not devote 
themselves to judging the acts of other govern-
ments carried out within their own territory. It 
was argued that reparation for damage caused by 
such acts should be made through the means 
made available by the sovereign governments be-
tween each other.23 
This doctrine was based on international 
courtesy and was applied without any major 
variations up to 1954, when the decision in the 
Bernstein case became the first exception. In this 
case, the plaintiff tried to recover the remains of 
20Banco Nacional de Cuba versus Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 
398. (The reference is to the compilation of sentences of the 
Uniteri States Supreme Court). 
2IOn the act of state doctrine of the United Kingdom, 
see Singer (1981). 
22On the act of state doctrine of the United States, see 
Leigh and Sandler (1976) and Rabinowitz (1977). 
23Underhill v. Hernández, 168 U.S. 250 (1897). 
goods confiscated by Germany between 1937 
and 1939.24 
In its traditional form, the doctrine would 
also have prevented the courts from deciding on 
the legality of the decisions of the German Gov-
ernment. In this case, however, the State Depart-
ment was in favour of reviewing the legality of 
the acts of the German Government.25 On this 
basis, the courts, disavowing their previous de-
cisions, ruled that the act of state doctrine was 
inapplicable and decided on the substance of the 
issue raised (Delson, 1972, p. 90). 
Later on, the Sabbatino case was brought 
before the courts, leading to what must be the 
most controversial decision ever made by the 
United States Supreme Court. One author 
called it the doctrine of "compulsive irrational 
abstention" (MacDougal). 
In 1960, Farr, a New York broker, bought 
sugar from C.A.V., a company organized in 
Cuba with capital belonging to United States 
citizens. He undertook to pay for the sugar 
against delivery of the shipping documents in 
New York. After the sugar had been shipped, 
G.A.V. was expropriated and became the pro-
perty of the Banco Nacional de Cuba, which 
charged its agent in New York with delivering 
the shipping documents against payment of the 
price. Farr refused to receive the documents and 
deposited the price with Sabbatino, the receiver 
appointed by the New York courts at the request 
of C.A.V. Banco Nacional's claim was rejected by 
the courts of first and second instance, which 
refused to apply the act of state doctrine and 
considered instead that international law had 
been violated by the Cuban Government in tak-
ing over the sugar by means of a discriminatory 
and vindictive act and without prior payment of 
compensation. The Supreme Court rejected the 
arguments of the lower courts and decided that it 
was not up to the judiciary branch to review the 
validity of an appropriation carried out by a for-
eign government within its territory in the absence 
of a treaty or agreement setting forth the legal 
rules applicable to expropriation. In brief, the 
Court considered that the act of state doctrine 
24Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, 
210 F. 2d. 375 (2 Cir. 1954); 48A. J.I.L. 499 (1954). See also 
Delson (1972). 
"Department of State Bulletin (May 8 1949). 
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was applicable and that any decision to the con-
trary could create a conflict between the ex-
ecutive and the judiciary branches, despite the 
fact that through the State Department, and in 
keeping with the Bernstein exception, the ex-
ecutive had stated that it had no objection to the 
court's reviewing the legality of the Cuban ex-
propriation decrees. Consequently, the act of 
state doctrine prevented the defendants from 
attacking the validity of the Cuban expropriation 
and the title of ownership presented by the 
plaintiffs.26 
In a later decision, the Court27 invoked the 
act of state doctrine in recognizing the validity of 
exchange controls and restrictions applied by a 
government on transactions in national and for-
eign currency. In this case, an investor had re-
ceived certificates from the Cuban Government 
which guaranteed him access to the foreign ex-
change market at a given rate of exchange. Sub-
sequently, the Government had suspended in-
definitely the conversion of those certificates into 
foreign exchange. The Court refused to reject 
the validity of that resolution, considering it to be 
inherent to the essential functions of a govern-
ment for the purpose of protecting its scanty 
resources in foreign currency, so that it could not 
be considered a "confiscation" or "appropria-
tion".28 As will be noted, this decision is in har-
mony with the experience of foreign investors in 
the United States when, in 1933, the United 
States Congress revoked guaranteed metal con-
version for the so-called gold clause, with respect 
to obligations payable in legal United States 
currency.29 On that occasion, the creditors had to 
resign themselves to receiving money the value 
26Public reaction to the Sabbatino case led the Congress 
to approve the two Hickenlooper amendments (77 Stat. 336 
(1963) 78 Stat. 1013 (1964)). The first amendment ordered 
the Executive to suspend foreign aid to countries which had 
not taken adequate measures in certain cases of expropria-
tion or nationalization or repudiation or'annulment of con-
tracts with United States citizens or companies. The second 
amendment prohibited the courts from applying the act of 
state doctrine in cases in which the title of ownership invoked 
was based on a confiscation carried out in violation of the 
principles of international law. 
" F r e n c h v. Banco Nacional de Cuba (23 N.Y., 2d, 63, 
295, N.Y., 2d, 449, 242, N.Y., 2d, 751-16). 
28French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, ibid. 
2<JThe joint resolution of Congress is dated 5 June 1933 
(48 Stat. 113 (1933, 31 U.S.C.A. 463 (1933)). 
of which was 59.06% lower than the value of cash 
before the Congressional resolution.30 
2. Immunity of jurisdiction 
Recognition of the international personality of a 
State as a member of the community of nations 
implies recognition of its equality, dignity, in-
dependence and territorial and personal su-
premacy (Oppenheim). The United Nations 
Charter, in article 2, para. 1, states that the 
Organization is based on the principle of the 
sovereign equality of all its Members. One con-
sequence of the principle of sovereign or ju-
ridical equality is that a State cannot exercise 
jurisdiction over another State nor can it be sued 
before foreign tribunals unless it voluntarily sub-
mits to such jurisdiction. 
For many years, the prevailing doctrine was 
that of the absolute immunity of the State, 
according to which all acts of the State and of its 
bodies, the acts and the person of its agents and 
representatives, its goods and properties could 
not be judged by courts other than those of the 
State itself. Nevertheless, in view of the economic 
activity carried out by the public sector after 
World War I, the European courts (Belgium and 
Italy) began to make a distinction between acts of 
the government as such -^jure imperii— and acts 
of a commercial nature —jure gestionis— and to 
refuse immunity for the latter (Brownlie). De-
spite this, during the same period, a Harvard 
University study came to the conclusion that the 
distinction between acts of government and acts 
of a commercial nature did not justify bringing a 
claim against a State for matters pertaining to its 
public debt (American journal of international Law, 
1932, p. 597). This conclusion was consistent 
with the opinion of Luis María Drago, according 
to whom public loans were sovereign acts (quoted 
byBorchard, 1951, p. 168), and with the position 
taken a long time ago by the English courts, when 
they refused to assumejurisdiction in respect of a 
claim brought to secure payment from Peruvian 
Government agents for bonds pertaining to that 
3 0Under decree dated 31 January 1934, the United 
States President fixed the new price of the gold dollar at a 
parity of 0.35 dollars per ounce of refined gold (Nussbaum, 
1954). 
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country's public debt.31 In that case, it was noted 
that the bonds were none other than com-
mitments of honour and that the contracts con-
cerned could not be executed before the courts 
of a foreign country, or even before those of the 
country which issued the bonds, without the con-
sent of the government of the latter country. 
There has been much theoretical discussion 
about the advisability of including the principles 
relating to sovereign immunity in a multilateral 
convention. Except for the 1972 European Con-
vention, which entered into force in 1976,32 
however, these efforts have not been successful. 
Considerable progress has been made, however, 
in the national legislation of several countries, 
especially the United States and the United King-
dom, whose laws are similar from both the philo-
sophical and the practical standpoints. In 1952, 
the United States declared, through the so-called 
"Tate Letter",33 that it accepted the restrictive 
doctrine of immunity and the distinction be-
tween acts of government and commercial acts of 
the State, and that it did not recognize immunity 
in respect of the latter. 
This, however, was not enough, and soon a 
special law had to be enacted.34 The United 
Kingdom, for its part, enacted its own special law, 
on 22 November 1978.35 We shall not go into this 
legislation in detail here, but will only point out 
that it restricts the immunity which had tradi-
tionally been invoked by Latin American gov-
ernments and public entities in respect of their 
activities abroad. The new legislation favours 
creditors, identifying and expanding on those 
cases in which they can exercise their rights be-
fore the courts of those countries, and restricting 
the occasions on which foreign defendants may 
invoke immunity of jurisdiction or of execution 
with respect to their persons or properties. 
In addition to reaffirming the immunity of 
3lTwycross v. Dreyfuss, 5 Ch. D. 605, 616 <C.A. 1877). 
3 2 T h e text of this convention appears in "17 In-
ternational Legal Materials", Washington D.C. (1978), p. 
1123. 
^Communication from the Deputy Legal Adviser lo 
the Department of State, 19 March 1952 (26 Dept. State Bull. 
984, 1952). 
34Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, No. 94-583, 21 Octo-
ber 1976. 
3 5 The text appears in Lauterpacht (1983). 
jurisdiction and of execution of a foreign State 
and its agents or enterprises in respect of federal 
and state courts, the United States law lists sever-
al exceptions to this immunity. These include 
cases when the foreign State expressly or implic-
itly waives jurisdiction and cases relating to the 
commercial nature of the act. 
One example of an explicit waiver of immun-
ity is the clause usually included in treaties on 
trade, friendship and shipping which the United 
States has signed with several countries (Craw-
ford, 1981, p. 826). With regard to tacit or im-
plicit waivers, it was noted, during discussions on 
the law in Congress, that the courts have con-
sidered that immunity is implicitly waived when a 
foreign State accepts arbitration in another coun-
try or when a foreign State agrees that the law of 
a given country is applicable to the contract.36 As 
is known, most loan contracts signed by the Latin 
American public sector include clauses on the 
application of foreign jurisdictions or laws and 
this, according to the above interpretation, 
would constitute an implicit waiver of immunity. 
The exception based on the commercial na-
ture of the act includes the following three situa-
tions: i) commercial activities carried out in the 
United States by a foreign State, its agencies or 
enterprises; ii) acts carried out in the United 
States in connection with commercial activities 
carried out in another place by a foreign State, its 
agencies or enterprises; and iii) acts carried out 
outside the territory of the United States by a 
foreign State, its agencies or enterprises, in con-
nection with commercial activities also carried 
out outside that territory but which produce di-
rect effects in the United States.37 
The original bill included a provision in 
which a distinction was made between the public 
debt of the central government and that of its 
political subdivisions, agencies or instrumentali-
ties and immunity of jurisdiction was granted only 
to the central government but not to the other 
bodies. Although this provision was eliminated 
from the final text, the interpretation has been 
that this means that both the public debt of the 
36Report of the Senate Committee on the Immunities 
Act (Senate Report No. 1310, 94th Congress, 2d. Sess. 18) 
(1976). 
"Article 1603 (d) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act. 
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central government and that of its agencies, sub-
divisions or enterprises constitute commercial 
transactions and are governed by the same rule 
and hence excluded from immunity. Delaume 
(1977, p. 405) points out that this interpretation 
would be consistent with Article 4 of the Eu-
ropean Convention, which states that all con-
tracts, including loans and other financial trans-
actions, between a Contracting State and private 
persons which are to be performed in another 
Contracting State, are subject to the non-
immunity rule set forth in the Convention. 
English law, on the other hand, has been 
more explicit and has established that a State 
does not enjoy immunity in respect of its com-
mercial transactions. The concept of "com-
mercial transactions", includes any loan or other 
transaction for the obtaining of financing and 
any guarantee or indemnity for such transaction 
or for any other financial obligation.38 
The United States Act also covers the prop-
erty of a foreign State and declares that it shall-
not be immune from attachment, sequestration 
and execution, without prejudice to several ex-
ceptions. One exception concerns property be-
ing used in commercial activities in the United 
States, which can be attached by a federal or State 
court when the foreign State has expressly or 
tacitly waived its immunity or the property has 
been or is being used in the commercial activities 
which gave rise to the lawsuit. In the case of 
property of agencies or enterprises of a foreign 
State involved in commercial activity in the 
United States, the exception is governed by the 
same rules as above, but is broader and covers 
In-1982, the problems arising from the Latin 
American financial crisis began to be brought up 
in New York courts as a result of lawsuits brought 
by transnational banks against Latin American 
any p r o p e r t y of such e n t e r p r i s e s or 
agencies, whether or not they have been 
used in the aforesaid commercial activity. 
Finally, as regards the property of a foreign 
central bank or monetary authority, there is a 
special rule according to which such property 
enjoys immunity from attachment and execu-
tion, provided the said central bank or monetary 
authority holds it on its own account and the 
government, bank or authority in question has 
not expressly waived immunity. 
The legal provisions mentioned above give 
rise to difficult problems of interpretation which 
have to be decided by the courts. We shall not list 
them all, but it is worth mentioning what has 
already happened with mixed bank accounts of 
foreign embassies, agencies and central banks. In 
a suit against the Embassy of Tanzania,39 the 
court authorized attachment of the Embassy's 
bank account because it was being used for the 
purchase of supplies, and this was considered to 
be a commercial activity. The court considered 
that immunity did not apply because the account 
had been used for other purposes and to decide 
otherwise would be to weaken the principle of 
the immunity of official bank accounts by allow-
ing their use for commercial activity (Crawford, 
pp. 863 and 864). 
The obvious risks of the above legal in-
terpretation have led one author to recommend 
that a foreign central bank in the United States 
should have a number ofbanks accounts in order 
to avoid possible attachment (Patrikis, 1982, p. 
287). 
public entities which had stopped making pay-
ments on their obligations. 
The decisions that have been adopted up to 
VI 
Recent decisions of United States courts in lawsuits against 
Latin American public entities 
39Birch Shipping Corporation v. Embassy of Tan-
'State Immunity Act, article 3, 3(b). zania, 507. 
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now are, as we shall see, confusing and con-
tradictory, and the controversies they have 
aroused in international circles are fully justified. 
This is not surprising if one considers the com-
plexity of the issues raised and the fact that 
national courts are being forced to decide on 
international affairs. Although from the Latin 
American point of view, these decisions have 
already had a significant impact, inasmuch as 
they reveal the context and modalities within 
which creditors exercise their rights, we can, at 
this point, only make some preliminary remarks, 
inasmuch as judicial review procedures have not 
yet been concluded and the number of lawsuits 
that have been brought is still small. Nonetheless, 
whatever criteria may prevail, what does seem 
clear is that the act of state doctrine and the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity will continue to 
have a decisive influence on the legal decisions 
that may be taken. 
In the judgements we shall discuss, the claim 
is made by a creditor who demands payment of 
the debt contracted by a public entity which has 
defaulted on one or more payments because of 
the enactment, by its government, of monetary 
control measures which have prevented it from 
obtaining foreign exchange to make payment. 
The events take place in the interval between 
the cessation of payment and the completion of 
formalities pertaining to agreements on 
renegotiation of the debt between the gov-
ernments concerned and their creditors. 
The lawsuits we shall discuss are Frankel v. 
Banco Nacional de México (hereinafter 
Frankel);40 Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de 
Costa Rica (hereinafter Libra Bank);41 and 
Allied Bank International v. Banco de Crédito 
Agrícola de Cartago (hereinafter Allied Bank). 
1. Frankel 
This lawsuit arose from the violation of obliga-
tions under a deposit contract on the part of 
Banco Nacional de México, a nationalized entity 
belonging to the Mexican State. The court 
accepted the immunity of jurisdiction invoked by 
40Frankel v. Banco Nacional de México, No. 82-6457 
slip, op (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
41Libra Bank v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F. 
Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
the defendant and held that the acts which were 
the object of litigation were not related to the 
certificate of deposit but rather to the norms and 
regulations enacted by the Mexican Government 
to control its currency and organize its economy. 
The court pointed out that the plaintiffs' claim 
against the behaviour of the defendant bank was 
none other than that the latter had complied with 
its country's exchange control norms and regula-
tions. According to the court, the control of its 
foreign exchange on the part of the Government 
of Mexico was a public act which could only be 
carried out by a sovereign State; it added that it 
was precisely that type of governmental act which 
could not be the object of judicial review under 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
As we have seen, in a very similar situation, 
such as the one arising from the devaluation of 
Cuban investment certificates in the French suit, 
the court also refused to review the acts of gov-
ernment. Nevertheless, although the result in 
both cases was the same, the doctrine invoked in 
French was the act of state doctrine, rather than 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which 
evidently would also have been the correct one to 
invoke in the Frankel case. 
2. Libra Bank 
In 1981, the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica 
(hereinafter Banco Nacional), which belonged to 
the State of Costa Rica, defaulted on payments 
on loans contracted a year before with Libra 
Bank. In August 1981, the Banco Central de-
cided that the only amortization payments on 
external loans that would be authorized would be 
those owed to multilateral financing agencies. In 
November, the Government enacted decree No. 
13103-H, which prohibited the Republic and the 
entities of the public sector from making capital 
or interest payments on the external debt with-
out the prior authorization of the Banco Cen-
tral, in consultation with the Minister of Finance. 
Banco Nacional did not obtain the authorization 
to make payments on its debt with Libra Bank 
and the latter sued in New York, demanding 
payment of the entire amount owed, arguing 
that the notes extended by Banco Nacional stipu-
lated that New York would be the place of pay-
ment, and there was a clause in the contract 
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whereby Banco Nacional expressly accepted to 
be sued in that city. 
Libra Bank asked for a summary judgement 
and Banco Nacional invoked, in its defence, the 
act of state doctrine, arguing that it had not been 
able to make payment because of the imposition 
of exchange restrictions in Costa Rica which con-
stituted a decision that was not subject to judicial 
review. 
The court accepted the claim and rejected 
the defence of Banco Nacional with a reasoning 
which we can only qualify as unusual. The Court 
stated that the situs of the debt was New York and 
not Costa Rica and then drew an analogy be-
tween Costa Rica's action and the confiscation of 
the goods and property of King Faisal n by the 
Government of the Republic of Iraq. In the latter 
case, the courts refused to grant extra-
territoriality to Iraq's confiscation decrees in re-
spect of the goods which Faisal possessed in New 
York, arguing that, although the decrees con-
stituted an act of state, such an act of state only 
affected the goods located within the territory of 
Iraq; with respect to those located in the United 
States, the courts would only enforce the decrees 
to the extent that they were consistent with the 
policy and law of the United States.42 The court 
reached the conclusion that the decrees were not 
consistent with the policy and law of the United 
States and therefore refused to enforce them. In 
the case of Costa Rica, the court considered that 
the 1981 decrees could not have extra-territorial 
effect but that the acts equivalent to confiscation 
were not the decrees but rather the government's 
decision to deprive Libra Bank of the right of 
receiving the payment owed to it by Banco 
Nacional. This decision of the Government of 
Costa Rica was assimilated to the act of confisca-
tion by Iraq, with the only difference, according 
to the court, that in the latter case the property 
confiscated was tangible, while in the case of Cos-
ta Rica, it was intangible. After concluding that 
the situs of the debt was New York, the court, 
without analysing the 1981 decrees, considered 
the act of state doctrine to be inapplicable be-
cause the acts of the Government of Costa Rica 
could only have had extra-territorial effect to the 
extent that they were consistent with the policy 
""Republic of Iraq-First National City Bank (353 F 2d 47 
(2d Cir 2965), cert, denied, 382 U.S. 10271 (1966)). 
and law of the United States. Considering that 
the acts in question were qualified as confiscatory 
and that no compensation was paid and that they 
would be repugnant to the constitution and laws 
of the United States, the Court refused to give 
validity to the defence of Banco Nacional based 
on the act of state doctrine and accepted the 
claim by Libra Bank. 
This decision also seems wrong and shows a 
failure to recognize the reasons of public order 
which lead a country affected by a severe finan-
cial crisis to restrict foreign exchange transac-
tions. The assimilation of a government act pro-
hibiting payment abroad in foreign exchange to 
the confiscation of the goods of a deposed 
monarch and the use of this as grounds for a 
sentence only reveals a regrettable confusion on 
the part of the court. 
3. Allied Bank 
The events which gave rise to this lawsuit were 
identical to those of the Libra Bank case. Allied 
Bank is the leader of a consortium of 39 banks 
which also brought suit in New York against a 
group of banks belonging to the Government of 
Costa Rica which had gone into default because 
of the 1981 decrees of that Government. 
The defendants (hereinafter Banco de Car-
tago), based their defence on the sovereign im-
munity and the act of state doctrines. The first 
defence was rejected because the judge con-
sidered that the collection of a note, which was 
what gave rise to the suit, constituted a com-
mercial act to which immunity did not apply. On 
the other hand, the judge did accept the defence 
based on the act of state doctrine because he 
considered that what had prevented Banco de 
Cartago from meeting its obligations with 
Allied were the Banco Central decisions, which the 
United States courts could not review. Thejudge 
added that a decision in favour of Allied in this 
case would entail a determination that the de-
fendants would have to make a payment which 
went against the orders of their government. 
This, according to the judge, would bring the 
United States judiciary into conflict with a for-
eign government, and that would upset relations 
between the executive branch of the United 
States Government and the Government of Cos-
ta Rica. 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN PUBLIC DEBT / Gonzalo Biggs 185 
In short, in this case, the court reached dif-
ferent conclusions than the judge in the Libra 
Bank case, despite the fact that the events and the 
de f endan t s ' a rguments were the same. 
Nevertheless, the Allied case brought up an in-
teresting side issue. 
In July, 1983, the parties abandoned the suit 
while steps were being taken to reschedule Costa 
Rica's external debt. On 9 September of the same 
year, the Government of Costa Rica and the Ban-
co Central signed a refinancing agreement with 
Allied and its representatives; of the 39 banks 
involved, however, one rejected the agreement: 
Fidelity Union Trust Company of New Jersey 
(Fidelity), which continued with the suit. 
The Court of Appeals rejected Fidelity's 
appeal, but for reasons entirely different from 
those adduced by the trial judge. The Court took 
into consideration the fact that the economic cri-
sis of Costa Rica had led the executive and legisla-
tive branches of the United States Government to 
provide economic assistance to that country and 
that, moreover, in the negotiations of the Club of 
Paris, the United States had approved the 
renegotiation of Costa Rica's intergovernmental 
debt. This circumstance was taken into account 
by the Court in rejecting Fidelity's argument on 
the inapplicability of the act of State doctrine, on 
the grounds that the situs of the obligation was 
New York and not Costa Rica. The Court's 
reasoning was that when the goods or contractual 
obligations affected by a decision of a foreign 
It is evident from the above that the legal aspects 
of negotiations concerning the refinancing or 
rescheduling of the Latin American public debt 
are extremely complex. Naturally, the legal 
aspects are only one part —though a very fun-
damental one— of the issue, and must be viewed 
within the broader context of relations between 
the Latin American governments and public 
entities and the transnational commercial banks. 
In light of the analysis we have made and of 
the need for these countries to take more suitable 
government are located in the United States, the 
courts will only recognize their validity when that 
is consistent with the policy and law of the United 
States. 
The court reached the conclusion that the 
decisions of the Costa Rican Government which 
resulted in the prohibition to pay the external 
debt were consistent with the policy and law of 
the United States and to support this conclusion, 
it referred to an 1883 decision.43 
On that occasion, the Supreme Court re-
jected a demand for payment brought by United 
States citizens holding bonds in a Canadian rail-
way company on the grounds that the company 
was being reorganized and was negotiating an 
agreement with its creditors. The Court con-
sidered this to be in harmony with the spirit of 
the bankruptcy laws recognized in all civilized 
countries. Similarly, the Court continued, Costa 
Rica's prohibition against making payments on its 
foreign debt was analogous to the reorganization 
of a business envisaged in the United States 
Bankruptcy Law44 and did not constitute 
repudiation of its obligations, but rather an ex-
tension of payment made in good faith for the 
purpose of renegotiating its obligations. In brief, 
the court decided that the decrees and decisions 
of the Costa Rican Government which prevented 
Banco de Cartago from paying its obligations in 
New York were consistent with the policy and law 
of the United States and that its validity should be 
recognized by the courts of that country. 
measures to protect their interests, we would like 
to make the following suggestions: 
a) The debtor countries should contract for 
permanent consultant services in London 
and/or New York. The consultant(s) should 
i) centralize, co-ordinate and make avail-
43Canada Southern Railway Co. and Gebbhard, 109 
U.S. 527 (1883). 
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able to governments the up-to-date in-
formation needed for an adequate 
renegotiation of each country's public 
debt; and 
ii) provide the legal advice that is essential 
for the proper conduct of the relevant 
negotiations. 
b) In emphasizing to the governments of the 
industrialized countries the importance of 
recognizing the political nature of the debt, 
the debtor countries should insist on: 
i) an increase in the contributions of gov-
ernments of industrialized countries to 
the international financing agencies, as a 
means of increasing the supply of public 
credit to Latin America and counteract-
ing the high cost of private credit and the 
burden which the service of this type of 
credit represents for the development of 
the region; 
ii) the adoption, in any renegotiation, of the 
imperative norm that the burden of the 
debt shall not be in excess of an amount 
that is compatible with each debtor coun-
try's payment capacity and development 
needs; and 
iii) consideration of specific formulas for 
reducing the burden of the debt, which 
may include conversion into bonds at 
fixed prices and interest rates, whose col-
lection and management might be en-
trusted to an existing intergovernmental 
entity or to one which might be es-
tablished in future. 
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